Abstract
The work aims to study the coordination of the supply chain for fresh agricultural products in the case of supplier misreporting the fresh activity of fresh agricultural products. The supply chain of fresh agricultural products was composed of a single supplier and a single retailer and the fresh activity of products was the supplier's private information. Based on the single cycle newsboy model, the profit function of all parties in the supply chain was constructed, and the basic idea of Stackelberg game was applied. The results of pricing order decision were analyzed, and the profit sharing contract was introduced to coordinate the supply chain. At the same time, Matlab software was used for numerical simulation to verify the effectiveness of the conclusion. The misreporting behavior of the supplier damaged the profits of all parties in the supply chain system, and the lower the misreporting factor (the higher the false reporting degree) was, the greater the influence on the supply chain profit was. When the income sharing ratio was within a certain range, the income sharing contract could effectively coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products. The benefit-sharing contract can effectively coordinate the fresh supply chain, and suppress the misreporting behavior of the supplier at the same time, which improves the Pareto and increases the stability of the supply chain.
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JIA Xin, CHEN Hua-fei.
Supply Chain Coordination of Fresh Agricultural Products under the Behavior of Misreporting[J]. Packaging Engineering. 2020(3): 70-76 https://doi.org/10.19554/j.cnki.1001-3563.2020.03.011
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